This paper has four related themes. It demonstrates that Marx's Communism in its first or Socialist phase would recognize the essential inequality of labour on grounds of efficiency and growth. It offers an explanation for the apparent paradox that Marx and Engels championed a fully-fledged control system notwithstanding appreciation of the allocation functions of a competitive market system. It highlights common ground relating to market process between Marx and Engels and the modern "classical liberals" Mises and Hayek. And it traces the evolutionary nature of the Marx-Engels perspective on transitions between and within economic systems.
Introduction
My first concern is the treatment of distribution by Marx and Engels within the general framework of "Historical Materialism." After a brief review of their rejection of egalitarian schemes based on "justice" or "morality" (Section 2.1), I proceed to their objections on grounds of the impossibility of divorcing distribution from conditions of production and the related exchange system. I demonstrate first that growing inequality is accorded a strategic and essential role in the evolution of a capitalist-exchange economy (Section 2.2). (In any event, Marx and Engels seem to have downplayed the quantitative significance for labour even of major transfers.) That the pattern of distribution could not be altered unilaterally without damaging consequences for production, is then shown to govern their hostility to schemes of Communist organization entailing wages paid according to "equal right" and "the undiminished proceeds of labour" (Section 2.3). In brief, Marx's Communism in its first phase (sometimes referred to as the Socialist phase), when there remains a residual influence exerted by the preceding institution, 1 would recognize the essential inequality of labour on grounds of efficiency and growth; the celebrated dictum "from each according to his abilities to each according to his needs" applied only in a utopian phase. Engels' rendition of these themes is approached in terms of his critique of Dühring (Section 3).
A high degree of respect for the allocative role of markets is then brought into the picture to explain Marx's rejection of contemporary rent-confiscation and price-control schemes (Section 4). I seek in this context to understand the championship of a fully-fledged Control system-social ownership of the means of production, central planning, abolition of markets for labour and goods, consumer rationing-notwithstanding such respect, and notwithstanding Engels' severe condemnation of Rodbertus and Dühring for neglecting the role of competition in their socialist schemes. Essentially, the system would ideally be simplified to the point that a sophisticated allocation mechanism was not required.
In Section 5, I draw some unexpected parallels entailing common ground on the approach to distribution and market process between Marx and Engels and the modern "conservative" or "classical liberal" writers Mises and
Hayek. An Appendix touches on aspects of Mises' reading of Marx on these and related matters.
An overview (Section 6) focuses on the cautious evolutionary nature of the Marx-Engels perspective: the development within Capitalism of forces preparing the ground for a political take-over by the proletariat, preeminently nationalization of industry; the period of transition to full Communism with continued though diminishing reliance on a capitalist sector, to which period the Communist Manifesto applied; and the two phases of Communism the first of which entailing a measure of inequality reflected in differential wage rates.
Objections to Egalitarian Reform

The Rejection of Claims Based on Justice
Marx insisted that his case for socialism did not turn on the immorality or inequity of capitalist wage-setting in particular or the pattern of distribution in general (Baumol 2001:231). 2 Rather to the contrary, "we must assume throughout that the wages being paid are economically just, i.e. determined by the general laws of political economy" (Grundrisse 1857/8; MECW 3 28:354). Or again: "is [present-day distribution] not, in fact, the only 'fair' distribution on the basis of the present-day mode of production?" (Critique of the Gotha Programme 1875; MECW 24:84). In his manuscript notes (completed after January 1881) on Adolphe Wagner's Lehrbuch der politischen oekonomie, Marx protests that he was falsely represented by Wagner as maintaining that profit was "a deduction from, or robbery of, the worker," whereas his position was the precise opposite:
On the contrary, I depict the capitalist as the necessary functionary of capitalist production and demonstrate at great length that he not only "deducts" or "robs" but enforces the production of surplus value, thus first helping to create what is to be deducted; what is more, I demonstrate in detail that even if only equivalents were exchanged in the exchange of commodities, the capitalist-as soon as he pays the worker the real value of his labour-power-would have every right, i.e. such right as corresponds to this mode of production, to surplus-value (MECW 24:535).
The obscure man falsely attributes to me the view that "the surplus-value produced by the workers alone remains, in an unwarranted manner, in the hands of the capitalist entrepreneurs." . . . In fact I say the exact opposite: that the production of commodities must necessarily become "capitalist" production of commodities at a certain point, and
